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THE ROCKEFELLER BOYS*
John D. Rockefeller knew a thing or two about power. His Standard Oil of
New Jersey became a blueprint for corporate centralization. He pioneered
new methods of stock rigging and financial mischief. He destroyed compe-
tition wherever he could and set new standards for industrial sabotage and
union busting. He manipulated the tastes of “rational consumers” and made
“policymakers” dance to his tune. He used violence to expropriate from
indigenous Americans their resource-rich lands, and religion to pacify their
resistance. He harnessed the U. S. military to impose American “free trade”
on the rest of the world.
Raw power made Rockefeller and his family enormously rich. And yet,
to the end of his life, John D. insisted that his best investment ever was the
$45 million he donated to rebuild the Baptist University of Chicago.
Rockefeller saw Chicago as a religious asset. The philanthropy helped
silence his critics in this world and pave his way to heaven in the next. It
bought him the loyalty of spiritual shepherds and academic retainers, all
eager to sing the praise of Standard Oil and glorify its devout owner. But in
the long run the biggest yield came from the university’s department of
economics.
After the Second World War, Chicago emerged as the bastion of a new
religion: neoclassical economics. The key tenets of the faith were laid down
already at the end of the 19th century, and it was Chicago — perhaps more
* The Israeli Economy, 1985–1998: From Government Intervention to Market Economics, edited by
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than any other university — that helped propagate them. Its professors,
nicknamed the Chicago Boys, spread the gospel of perfect competition and
free trade. They insisted that consumers were sovereign and economic ac-
tors rational. They called for the separation of politics from economics. They
preached monetarism and demanded small government and sound finance.
They made economics a mathematical pseudo-science, impenetrable to the
laity. And they advocated the production function and the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital — an ingenious model that justified the political rule of
capital while making capitalists such as Rockefeller perfectly invisible.
For these feats, the Chicago Boys were awarded plenty of Nobel Prizes.
These included, among others, the prize to Gary Becker for his human capi-
tal, to Theodore Schultz for his development economics, to Robert Lucas
for his rational expectations, to George Stigler for his attack on regulation,
to Ronald Coase for his transaction costs and to Milton Friedman for his
anti-Keynesianism.
Subsequent generations of the Rockefellers presented a more moder-
ate image than did their forefather. Theirs was no longer the wild capital-
ism of John D. The mutual business sabotage and political confrontations
that characterized the 19th century gave way in the 20th century to a more
stable formation of statism and corporate alliances. The Rockefellers entered
high politics where they promoted a mellow hybrid of “liberal Republican-
ism”; they engaged in imperial philanthropy, and financed an intricate web
of research foundations that helped soften the harshness of capitalism.
But the original virus nourished by John D. was unstoppable. Neoclas-
sical ideology — or neoliberalism, as it is now known — continued to spread
throughout the globe. It programmed the technocrats from Santiago to
Moscow. It placated the populace from China to South Africa. It reduced
risk far better than any other organized religion. It helped open the world
for business.
Although the neoclassicists assailed Israel early on, initially their suc-
cess was limited. During the 1950s, with the memory of the Great Depres-
sion still fresh, the promise of American “free competition” seemed dubious.
Local planning initiatives proved rather successful and the Israeli elites pre-
ferred to stick with the European model of government intervention in a
mixed economy.1
1 Our emphasis here on the pragmatic outlook of the ruling elite is different from conven-
tional perceptions on the issue. Many academics think of Israeli government interven-
tion and its mixed economy as consequences of the country’s social-democratic impulse
and the leading political role played by the confederation of labor unions (Histadrut).
Those who entertain this view, though, usually are unfamiliar with the evolution of the
power structures and institutions of Israeli capitalism (see Nitzan and Bichler, 2002, pri-
marily ch. 3).
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The neoclassical missionaries, though, were undeterred. In the 1950s,
they established their first bridgehead — the Maurice Falk Institute for
Economic Research, funded by an American donor. The first head of the
Institute was Don Patinkin, a young PhD from the University of Chicago.
Patinkin put the institute to good use, setting it up to train cadres of local
neoclassicists, later known as the Patinkin Boys.
These cadres started their ascent in the late 1950s. The Israeli elite, busy
with its day-to-day activities, had never bothered to turn its practical experi-
ence into a systematic theory of planning. And as the Cold War gathered
momentum, there was little intellectual opposition to stand in the way of
free market ideology. The Patinkin Boys moved quickly and soon enough
started to fill the halls of academia and the offices of the civil service.
The first major output of the Falk Institute were two monographs on
the Israeli economy: The Israeli Economy in the First Decade, written by Patinkin
himself (1960b in Hebrew; 1960a in English), and The Economic Development
of Israel, written by Halevi and Klinov-Malul (1968).
Patinkin’s was the first academic monograph to describe the Israeli
economy from the macro perspective of Keynesianism. It provided the theo-
retical framework for the nascent Israeli national accounts, and it offered
the first systematic empirical mapping of the country’s aggregate perfor-
mance. The attempt, of course, was riddled with anomalies. The first de-
cade of the new country was marked by a tight austerity policy. Consequently,
the author had to reconcile official prices that were determined by admin-
istrative decree with actual prices that often bore no relation to government
stipulations. He had to deal with multiple fixed exchange rates that had little
to do with “free” market forces. And he had to work with a highly central-
ized resource allocation, including in the so-called private sector. But all in
all, it must be said that Patinkin managed to subjugate his neoclassical–
monetarist instinct to the nationalist Keynesianism of the day.
At the time, both books — Patinkin’s and Halevi and Klinov-Malul’s —
faced a serious problem. Until the late 1960s, Israeli economic development
was stirred more or less exclusively by the government and labor-related orga-
nizations. And yet, despite this unwarranted intervention in the allocation of
resources, the country’s economic performance was among the best in the
world. GDP and per capita income grew at a breakneck pace. Moreover — and
in open defiance of conventional growth theory — the distribution of income
remained relatively equal, with the top quintile earning roughly three times
more than the bottom quintile. This reality forced the Falk authors to tread
carefully. They agreed that economic performance was impressive; but that
performance, they suggested, would have been even more impressive if only
markets had been liberalized. Israel’s socialist tradition, they argued, created
numerous distortions whose removal was bound to lead to far greater efficiency.
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The third book in the Falk series, titled The Israeli Economy: Maturing
Through Crisis and edited by a student of Patinkin, was much more upbeat
(Ben-Porath, 1986 in English; 1989 in Hebrew). The book was written at a
historical crossroads, just before the fall of the ancien régime. Signs of a fin de
siècle were everywhere. The Palestinian Intifada was already in full swing (al-
though, being irrelevant to the science of economics, it naturally went un-
mentioned). The Israeli military–financial complex was pulled down by the
global unwinding of military spending. And the process of stagflationary
redistribution that greatly enriched the big economy was running out of
steam. Together, these processes presented a grave threat to the dominant
capital groups. These groups prospered through a regime of militarized stag-
flation and accumulation-through-crisis, and that regime was now coming to
an end. There was an urgent need for a new order of “peace dividends,” and
Maturing Through Crisis expressed this need for structural change.2
The crisis brightened the outlook for liberalization. “Israel,” wrote Ben-
Porath, was “in the midst of attempting to overcome severe economic distress
shown by galloping inflation, stunted growth and a larger national debt” (1989,
1). The distress was blamed on the “global energy crisis and the rising defense
burden following the Yom Kippur War” (1989, 7), but there was clearly a “need
for structural reforms and for changing the rules of the game . . . ” (1).
Another decade passed and the battle was finally won. At last, Israel was
a reformed country. The subtitle of the fourth Falk book — edited by Ben-
Bassat (2001 in Hebrew; 2002 in English) — announced the victory: From
Government Intervention to Market Economics. And indeed, much of the text
reads like a victory album, Rockefeller-style.
According to the authors, Israel’s economic history could be divided
into two periods: before and after the 1985 Stabilization Program. During
the first period, the economy apparently was mired in chaos. Besieged by a
rigid bureaucracy, government intervention, a labyrinth of regulation and
numerous distortions, Israel was repeatedly thrown from crisis to inflation
to recession. Then came the Stabilization Program, which, together with “the
downsizing of government, the structural reforms, and the peace process
have helped to accelerate economic growth, particularly in the business
sector” (2002, 1). The heroes of the saga were the architects of the Stabili-
zation Program — that is, the Patinkin Boys of the Falk Institute. Their pro-
gram, we are told, brought a “profound change in the economic thinking
of policymakers”; it not only “restored stability in the economy and extri-
cated it from the crisis,” but also “marked a turning point in the economic
2 On the rise and demise of militarized stagflation and accumulation-through-crisis in Is-
rael, see Bichler and Nitzan, 1996, and Nitzan and Bichler, 1996.
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approach of the two large political parties,” whose outlook finally embraced
the virtues of “market forces” (1).
Reading these lines, it is hard to decide whether to laugh or cry. The
so-called neoliberal transformation of the 1990s was part of a global change
in the nature of capital accumulation. In country after country this trans-
formation involved the dismantling of the welfare state, the downsizing of
public services and the decline of government investment. In many cases it
included geopolitical realignment, peace agreements and foreign capital
inflow sponsored by the Washington Consensus. And practically everywhere
it was used for massive privatization at bargain prices, thinly veiled as struc-
tural reforms. And yet, in Israel the process was different. Here, we are told,
it was a matter not of global capital accumulation, but of local “policymakers”
who suddenly saw the light.
The authors also seem to count on their readers’ short memory. “The
new economic approach,” declares Ben-Bassat, “has achieved a success worth
imitating” (48). And indeed, relative to the abyss of 1985, macroeconomic
performance has improved. But then, if you put this “success” in historical
context, you begin to wonder whether the authors themselves have forgotten
the facts. And the facts, illustrated in the accompanying figure, tell a rather
different story. The data show that during the “socialist” 1950s and 1960s,
income per capita grew at an average annual rate of 5.7%; they further show
that during the 1970s and 1980s, after a political turnaround had brought
Likud to the government and “liberalization” to the economy, the rate
dropped to 2.3%; that in the 1990s, with “neoliberalism” in full swing, per
capita growth dropped to 1.9%; and that by the early 2000s, with “market
forces” finally in control, per capita income fell by 0.2% annually.3 The chart
also shows the path of unemployment, whose surge to an all-time high dur-
ing the 1990s provides further evidence of the program’s undeniable success.
But there is no such thing as a free lunch. Success is always costly. And
indeed, “growth and the rise in standard of living,” we are informed, “have
come at a price — greater inequality in income distribution” (4). Precisely
who pays this “collective” price — and who may benefit from it — are ques-
tions the authors never bother to pose. Based on their econometric research,
though, they know enough to tell us that the inequality has grown partly
because of “excess demand” for “human capital” (ch. 15, by Dahan). An-
other revelation, backed by equally scientific regressions, is that the fall in
government expenditure was influenced by lower military spending, which
in turn was affected by the “decline of the intensity of the Israeli–Arab
conflict” (ch. 2, by Strawczynski and Zeira).
3 The negative growth of the early 2000s cannot be seen in the chart, having been masked
by the smoothing of the data.
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The book is full of such insights. Economists who read it may feel comfort-
able with its familiar jargon, numerous regressions and endless neoclassical
platitudes. But they will learn nothing of what really happened in Israel.
Indeed, there is nothing new in this volume. Thousands of such trite mono-
graphs are published year after year, in country after country. Together, they
provide the “scientific” backing for the rule of capital and the smokescreen
to hide the rulers themselves.
Reading this particular book, you’ll learn nothing on the conflictual
nature of Israel’s capitalist development, its ruling class and its dominant
capital groups (who, incidentally, sponsored its publication). You’ll remain
ignorant of the enormous boost to accumulation provided by regional wars
and domestic inflation during the 1970s and 1980s. You’ll know nothing of
The Victory of "Market Forces"
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the high-tech redistribution of the 1990s, in which transnational firms and
local operators made fortunes by eviscerating Israeli society. You’ll be blind
to the global criminal networks centered in Israel and their deep penetra-
tion into the country’s politics. You’ll be unaware of the massive money laun-
dering that the country’s ruling class tacitly promotes. You’ll hear scarcely a
word about the Palestinians, the political economy of occupation and the
cost of settlements. You won’t know that under the guidance of the invis-
ible hand and its rightwing government, many Israelis now suffer from hun-
ger and homelessness, conditions that until recently were reserved only for
the Palestinians. And you certainly won’t suspect that much of Israel is now
owned by a small oligarchy of local–global investors.
But then, that is part of the victory of capital, and the victors always
rewrite history. Rockefeller certainly knew what to invest in. His boys have
done their job well.
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